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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
MELVILLE L. MORRIS,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 16838

DWANE J. SYKES and
PATRICIA SKYES,
Defendants and
Appellants.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent brought an action asking the trial court for
an order requring appellants to accept the unpaid balance due
under a land purchase contract and to execute and deliver a
warranty deed to the property to the respondent, or, in the
alternative, to relieve respondent from the harshness of the
forfeiture and retaking of the property by appellants, as
sellers, without compensation to respondent, as buyer, and
asking the Court to order appellants to return to respondent the
money paid on the contract by respondent, or such part as the
Court found to be equitable.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried on June 14, 15 and 18, 1979, before
the Honorable J. Robert Bullock sitting in equity without a
jury.

The Court found in favor the the appellants and against

the respondent on the issue of requiring the appellants to
accept the unpaid contract balance and deed the property to
respondent.

The Court found for respondent and against the

appellants holding that the forfeiture and retaking of the
property and retaining the money paid on the contract was a
wholly unreasonable penalty and its enforcement under all the
circumstances to be inequitable.

The Court entered judgment

requring a reimbursement to the respondent buyer of $14,121.54
of the $23,216.72 paid on the contract.

Appellants Motion to

Amend Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment, or
in the Alternative for a New Trial was denied by the Court on
December 24, 1979.

Appellants' appealed this decision of the

Court and its denial of the Motion to Amend the Findings or in
the Alternative for a New Trial.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have the Court sustain the trial
court and find that under Alaska law and the facts of the case
the enforcement of a strict forfeiture would be a violation of
the basic principals of equity, good conscience, and fair
dealing.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 3, 1974, the respondent, as buyer, entered
into a real estate contract with appellants, as sellers, of a
vacant tract of land of approximately 27 acres known as Tract
"B" of the Musk Ox Subdivision located near Fairbanks, Alaska.
The contract provided for a $2,000.00 down payment and monthly
payments of $350.00 commencing December 1, 1974.

In addition,

the buyer was to pay $1,000.00 November 1, 1974, $5,000.00 on
February 1, 1974 $5,000.00, August 1, 1975, and $3,000.00 each
succeeding February 1 and August 1 until November 1, 1979, when
the contract balance was to be paid in full.

The total purchase

price was $40,000.00 (Exh. 1).
The parties agreed First National Bank of Fairbanks,
Alaska, would be the escrow agent for the transaction to hold
certain papers and receive the contract payments.

Respondent,

as buyer, was informed there was a trust deed lien on the
property held by the same bank and that respondent 's contract
payments would be used by the bank to make the payments on the
trust deed obligation.
After the execution of the agreement appellant, Dwane
Skyes, moved to Utah.

The respondent's residence was divided

between Florida, California and Brussels, Belgium.

All payments

made by respondent, except one payment of $1,000.00, were made
by respondent to the escrow bank (Exh. 5).
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-4The monthly payments and periodic lump sum payments
were often made late or at different times than called for by
the contract, and many payments were made in amounts different
than called for.

The contract was in default almost from its

inception and was seriously in default at the time of the
termination, November 11, 1976.

(Exh. 5)

Because of the way the payments were made, the fact
that respondent was in and between Brussels, Florida and
California, and appellants were in Utah, considerable confusion
and misunderstanding developed regarding the status of the payments.

Appellants in their statement of facts go into consider-

able detail to show that respondent was deliberately misrepresenting to the appellants the payments he had made and the
status of the contract, but a careful reading of the entire
transcript indicates the so called misrepresentations were more
likely an outgrowth of confusion on the subject and lack of
communication between the parties.
Appellants sent written communications to respondent on
December 3, 1975, advising that payments were several months
behind and on December 29, 1975, advising that the last monthly
payments made were for July and August of 1975, and that
appellants' loan at the bank was delinquent because of
respondent's delinquency and subject to termination which the
bank could initiate at any moment.

No subsequent written notice
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was given to respondent regarding the contract delinquency, and
appellants continued to accept late payments.
Between October 3, 1974 and August 2, 1976, respondent
made some fourteen payments totaling $23,216.72 of which
$3,507.38 was in payment of interest and $19,709.34 was applied
to principal.

The unpaid contract balance after the August 2,

1976 payment was $20,290.66.
Respondent testified that in August 1976, he decided to
try to refinance the contract, went to the escrow bank in early
September and received

~entative

approval for a loan to pay off

the contract; and on October 5, 1976 signed a note, and trust
deed for the loan and furnished the bank with an updated title
report, a current appraisal and a financial statement.

6, 7)

(Exhs.

There is a conflict in the testimony as to when the

request was made, but respondent called appellant, Dwane Sykes,
and advised him of the pending refinancing of the contract and
that the bank wanted a written authorization from appellant to
use funds paid by the respondent on contract to pay off
appellants• trust deed to the bank (Rl73:4-8; R308:21-29; R309:
21-23). Appellant, Dwane Sykes, agreed to give such
authorization (although he contended the bank did not need it)
after respondent signed a contract for the purchase of two other
lots, designated as Lots 13 and 14 (Rl73:20-26).

Appellant

agreed to send the contract for the two lots to respondent.
There followed a series of phone calls over a period of weeks
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-6from respondent to appellant asking if the contract had been
sent, to which calls appellant apoligized for the delay and
promised to send the contract.
On November 15, 1976, the contract for lots 13 and 14
at a purchase price of $20,000.00 was received in the mail by
respondent who was then in California.

Respondent signed the

contract on November 16, 1976, and mailed it back that day with
his check for $3,000.00 down payment (Rl95:6-30) (Exh. 9).
Appellant subsequently rejected the offer made by respondent in
the contract (Rl99: 17-23) (Exh. 10).
On November 11, 1976,

appellan~s

caused a Notice of

Termination of the contract on the Musk Ox property (Exh. 4) to
be issued and sent to the respondent who received it on November
17, 1976.

Appellants closed the escrow at the bank, withdrew

the documents and latter recorded the quit claim deed from
respondent to appellants which had been part of the escrow
documents.
On November 17, 1976, respondent called appellant
concerning the Notice of Termination; appellant professed no
knowledge of it but later confirmed it had been given because of
respondent~

delinquency.

Up until the receipt of the Notice of Termination,
respondent was telephoning appellant repeatedly attempting to
get the authorization requested by the bank to complete the
refinancing and pay off the contract.

Appellant never gave the

requested authorization (Rl75:9-15; 176:6-20).
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-7The property at the time of the termination was worth
as much as it had been sold for to respondent, i.e., $40,000.00
( Rl 77: 23-25) .
On February 9, 1977, the bank sent a letter to the
appellants advising them that their loan was delinquent and
demanding payment of the delinquent amounts within thirty (30)
days or the bank would accelerate the obligation and foreclose
its trust deed (Exh. 30).
On February 15, 1977, appellants entered into an
Earnest Money Agreement for the sale of the Musk Ox property to
Johnny Iverson and by a deed dated February 15, 1977 and
delivered to Iverson in early April 1977, conveyed the property
to Iverson.

The purchase price was $20,663.38 (approximately

one-half the value of the property) payable $8,ooo.oo cash and
assumption of the trust deed obligation at the bank in the
amount of $12,663.38.

Johnny Iverson was the brother-in-law of

appellants (R302:21-24; R303:17-25).
During the period between the receipt of the Notice of
Termination and the agreement to sell the property to Iverson,
negotiations were taking place between appellant and respondent
to permit respondent to reinstate the delinquent contract.

A

condition of reinstatement in each instance required respondent
to purchase the two other lots, 13 and 14, for $25,000.00.
These are the same lots appellants sent the contract to
respondent on for $20,000.00.

Respondent declined to reinstate

on those conditions (Exh. 10 and Rl78:10-30; Rl79:1-26).
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-8By Notice of Default and Election to Sell dated July

18, 1977, the trustee in the trust deed given to the bank by
appellants gave notice that the property would be sold on
October 19, 1977 (Exh. 31) .
The Musk Ox property was vacant and in its unimproved
state would produce no income.

According to appellants •

testimony the use of the property was worth approximately $500
to $600 a year.
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE ALASKSA LAW
ON FORFEITURE AND DAMAGES
Respondent believes that Points II and III of
appellants• brief are included in the subject matter of Point I;
so,

respondent~

brief will treat Points I, II and III together.

In this matter the trial court indicated that the law
of Alaska was the applicable law, but indicated that the Court
did not believe that the Alaska law was significantly different
from Utah law.
The trial court was correct in its application of
Alaska law and was also correct in concluding Alaska law was not
significantly different from Utah law so far as refusing to
enforce a forfeiture which would be inequitable.
Utah Courts have adopted some guidelines regarding
forfeiture in land purchase contracts which appear to be absent
from case law in Alaska, but neither Court has allowed a strict
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-9forfeiture which violated fundamental principles of equity and
fair dealing.
In the case of Land Development, Inc. vs. Padgett, 369
P.2d 888 (Alaska 1962) the Court refused to enforce literally the
forfeiture provision of the contract and adopted a rule which
remains the law in Alaska that where the equities so indicate,
the Court is justified in refusing to enforce a forfeiture
provision of a contract.

In that case, the buyers had paid

principal and interest in the amount of $9,500.00, leaving a
balance due on principal of $2,435.00.
In Jameson vs. Wurtz, 396 P.2d 68 (Alaska 1964) in
reversing the lower court which had denied the purchaser specific
performance of a long term real estate contract the Court stated
at page 74:
"Moreover in Land Development, Inc. vs. Padgett,
this Court has established by case rule in Alaska
the further principle that where the contract
involves land the buyer will be relieved from
strict forfeiture if enforcement of the
forfeiture would cause a loss to him all out of
proportion to any injury that might be sustained
by the seller.
In the Jameson case, the Court also stated at Page 74:
"Also to be considered is the principal that equity
abhors a forfeiture and will seize upon slight
circumstances to relieve a party therefrom.
Speaking on this principle the Supreme Court of
the United States has said:
'Forfeitures are not favored in the law.
They are often the means of great
oppression and injustice. And, where
adequate compensation can be made, the
law in many cases, and equity in all
cases, discharges the forfeiture, upon
such compensation being made • • • '"·
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The Court also recognized the legal principle approved
by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Shull vs. Welch, (387 P.2d
606) that:
"In an
of the
and it
weight

equitable action, the presumption is in favor
correctness of the finding of the trial court,
will not be set aside unless against the clear
of the evidence".

In the matter before this Court, the trial court awarded
to the appellants compensation of $3500.00, and interest on the
contract balance from the date of the last payment, August 2,
1976 to August 15, 1977, although the contract was terminated
November 11, 1976 (Rl09: 6 a, b, c).

This in the opinion of the

trial court constituted adequate compensation to the appellant.
In Williams vs. DeLay, 395 P.2d 839 (Alaska 1964), the
Court after dealing with points of law and a line of cases from
other jurisdictions stated at page 846:
"The foregoing may be acceptable principles of law
in their place, but in Alaska we are committed to
the rule announced in our decision in the case of
Land Development, Inc. vs. Padgett that the trial
court may refuse to enforce literally the forfeiture
provisions of a real estate contract, for this is
a matter of discretion which is directly related to
the equities of the situation."
In Moran vs. Holman, 501 P.2d, 769, although (Alaska
1972) the buyer had made only six monthly payments in the course
of 16 months and had defaulted in other provisions of the
contract, the trial court refused to enforce the forfeiture
provisions of the contract.

At page 771 the Court states:
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"While the Court has so far refused to enforce the
forfeiture provisions of an installment land contract
only in cases involving more sizeable investments by
the vendee prior to the vendor's invocation of the
forfeiture, we did not intend in Padgett, DeLay,
Jameson, or McCormick to promulgate a purely quantitative rule. Rather, we adopted the position espoused
by the United States Supreme Court in Knickerbocker
Life Insurance Company vs. Norton, 96 US 234, that
'where adequate compensation can be
made - -equity - - discharges the
forfeiture, upon such compensation
being made'.
"The primary consideration for a Court faced with a
choice between specific performance and
enforcement of a forfeiture clause was stated
well in Ward vs. Union Bond and Trust Company~ 243
Federal· 2d. 476:
"The ultimate aim in these proceedings
in equity must be to save the
respective parties harmless from loss
or damage and, if just and equitable,
place them in the status quo of their
contract so as to permit them as vendor
and vendee to each have the benefit of
their respective bargains, voluntarily
entered into - - - not to be measured in
the light or economics of subsequent
events, but as of the day of the
contract'"·
The one Alaska case which permits a strict forfeiture is
Alaska Placer Company vs. Lee, 455 P.2d 218 (Alaska 1969) and is a
case in which the purchase price was $400,000.00; the buyer had
paid only $2,500.00 and had defaulted in other provisions of the
contract.

In that case the Court stated at Page 227:
"Considering the very small percentage of the total
purchase price paid by Lee, the fact that in prior
years Lee had failed to put the mining claims in
production, and the fact that appellant was counting
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on Lee to produce in 1965, which he did not do, we
do not consider it inequitable to enforce the forefeiture clause of the contract according to its
terms."
Appellants cite the case of Lonas vs. Metropolitan
Mortgage and Securities Company, 432 P.2d 603 (Alaska 1967) as
authority for the proposition that the Alaska law allows enforcement of a forfeiture if that remedy is provided in the contract.
The case does not go into the matters of the equities involved or
the loss sustained by each of the parties in the event of
forfeiture.

This case really stands for the proposition that a

forfeiture provision in a contract, unless made the exclusive
remedy by the contract itself, does not exclude the pursuit of
any other remedy which the law affords.

In that case the Court

states at page 605:
"The forfeiture provision is not made exclusive. In
such a case, the seller is entitled to pursue in addition to the remedy specifically mentioned in the contract, any other remedy which the law affords."
In the instant case, the trial court found that over a
period of 22 months respondent made some 14 payments totaling
$23,216.72, leaving an unpaid contract balance of $20,290.66. The
Court then applied the Alaska law and in its discretion denied
the enforcement of forfeiture provision of the contract as being
inequitable under the circumstances, but in keeping with the
Moran and Knickerbocker cases (supra) awarded to the appellants
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which the Court considered to be adequate compensation in the
matter.
Appellants in point II of their brief contend that notwithstanding the plaintiff's repeated defaults and misrepresentations, the trial court erroneously refused to enforce the
contract terms for termination of contract rights.
The trial court did not refuse to enforce the contract
terms for termination of contract rights; the trial court allowed
the termination to stand but refused to allow appellants to
retain all the payments made by respondent as liquidated damages
because the Court found that to do so would be an inequitable
forfeiture.
Appellants go to considerable detail to show that
respondent had not done equity and could not ask the Court to
grant equity to him, but appellants in their brief fail to state
that up until the termination of the contract, negotiations were
taking place between the parties for paying off the contract
through respondent's making a loan from the bank.
Respondent notified appellants he had been to the bank
to get a loan to pay off the contract and asked respondent to
give the bank written authorization, requested by the bank, to
use proceeds from the payoff of the contract to pay appellants'
obligation to the bank.
The appellants never did furnish the requested authorization.

Instead, appellants agreed to send such authorization
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-14after respondent had signed a contract to purchase two other
lots.

Before the contract on the two lots was received by

respondent for signature, the Notice of Termination had already
been issued.
One who frustrates the performance of a contract by his
own conduct - the setting of conditions he has no legal right to
assert - cannot in equity ask the Court to find he comes into
Court with clean hands and grant him relief at the expense of the
other party.
The trial court had all this before it together with
evidence of respondent's defaults and so-called misrepresentations, and based on all the facts concluded that to enforce the
forfeiture provision and permit the appellants to take back the
property worth as much as it was worth when it was sold to the
respondent and to retain the entire $23,216.72 paid by respondent
would be inequitable.
It is respondent's position that when appellants
terminated the contract and took the property back they made an
election; they knew what they were getting; they knew the trust
deed they had given on the property to the bank was delinquent.
They then had the property worth at least as much as it had been
sold for to respondent; they had some $23,000.00 of respondent's
money.

To allow them to retain both would be inequitable.
Appellants argue that to require them to return part of

the money paid be respondent would be to reward the defaulting
party at the expense of the party not in default.
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In arriving at this position, appellants further argue
that they were forced to sell the property at half its value or
what was was owed by respondent on the contract.
Respondent at the trial unsuccessfully objected to
evidence of the so-called distress sale, maintaining that the
rights and equities of the parties were fixed when the contract
was terminated.
But even in the light of such evidence, there are
defects in appellants' agrument:
1.

Appellants did not have to sell the property, at the

time they did under the adverse circumstances of wintertime. The
Notice of Default and Election to Sell given on behalf of the
bank which held appellants' trust deed was not given until July
18, 1977 and the sale, as set in the notice, was not to take
place until October 19, 1977.

Appellants would have had the time

from November 11, 1976, when they terminated the contract, until
October 19, 1977 in which to sell the property at a fair price.
2.

The purchaser at what the appellants contend to be a

distress sale by them for one-half the value of the property was
to appellants' brother-in-law.

This cannot, in an equity matter

be considered as an arms length, fair transaction.
This entire approach is contrary to the principle set
forth in the Ward case (supra) that the aim of "proceedings in
equity must be to save the parties harmless from loss or damage,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-16-

and if just and equitable, place them in the status quo of their
contract to permit them to have the benefit of their respective
bargains, voluntarily entered into --- not to be measured in the
light or economics of subsequent events, but as of the day of
contract".

(Emphasis added)
POINT II

THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS
ENTITLED TO NOTICE OF THE INTENDED SALE AND REASONABLE
OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE DEFENDANT WHOLE BEFORE THE SALE WAS MADE.
The Court had before it evidence that respondent in
August 1976 decided to try to refinance the contract and went to
the escrow bank in early September 1976 and received tentative
approval for a loan to pay off the contract and on October 5,

1976, signed a note and trust deed and furnished other requested
information and documents to the bank. Respondent called
appellant Dwane Sykes and advised him of the pending loan and the
payoff of the contract and further advised appellant that the
0

bank wanted written authorization from him to use funds paid by
respondent on the contract to pay off the trust deed loan to the
bank. Appellant agreed to give such authorization after
respondent signed a contract for the purchase of two other tracts
of land, lots 13 and 14, for $20,000.00.

Appellant agreed to

send the contract for the two lots to respondent.

There followed

a series of phone calls from respondent to appellant attempting
to get appellant to send the contracts to him so he could then
get the requested authorization and close his loan at the bank.
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On November 15, 1976, the contract for the two lots
(Exh. 9) was received in the mail by respondent who was then in
California and who signed the contract November 16th and mailed it
back with his check for the $3,000.00 down payment.

On November

17, 1976, respondent received the Notice of Termination (Exhibit

4) dated November 11, 1976.

Later, respondent's offer to purchase

lots 13 and 14, as evidenced by the contract, was rejected by
appellants.
Based on this, it was apparent to the trial court, that
appellants had in fact frustrated respondent's making a loan to pay
off the contract and that appellants terminated the contract
while negotiations were going on between the parties relating to
the loan and the payment of the contract.
Appellants further contend that after the termination
respondent never did tender cash or a cashiers check to anyone to
pay the delinquincy and reinstate the contract.

Respondent

refused to reinstate because a condition of reinstatement made by
appellants in each instance required respondent to purchase lots
13 and 14 for $25,000.00; these are the same lots for which the
appellant sent the contract to respondent at a purchase price of
$20,000.00.

Respondent declined to be forced to purchase the

lots at this higher price as a condition of reinstating his
contract on the Musk Ox property.
This is but one other facet of the case which the Court
had before it in making its decision.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court had before it all the facts necessary to
make its decision.

Based on those facts, it found that under

Alaska Law a forfeiture would be inequitable.

In arriving at its

decision and applying principles of equity it granted to
appellants what it considered to be reasonable compensation.
In reviewing the findings and decision of the trial
court, the presumption is in favor of the correctness of the
finding of the trial court and it will not be set aside unless
against the clear weight of the evidence.

In this case, there is

no clear weight of evidence against the findings made by the
Court.
It is respectfully requested that this Court affirm the
trial court.
~~

Dated this_\_;1_ day of May, 1980.

A. H. Boyce
Attorney for Respondents
500 American Savings Building
61 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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this \~~day of May, 1980, by placing the same in the United
States mail, postage prepaid.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

